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a b s t r a c t
Traditionally, financial market participation has been treated as analogous to playing games of chance
with a physical device such as roulette. Here, we propose that humans treat financial markets as
intentional agents, with own beliefs and aspirations. As a result, the capacity to infer the intentions of
others, Theory of Mind, explains behaviour. As evidence, we appeal to results from recent studies of:
(i) forecasting in the presence of insiders, (ii) trading inmarketswith bubbles, and (iii) financial contagion.
Intensity of, and skill in, Theory of Mind explains heterogeneity, not only in choices but also in neural
activation.
© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
The Fed has ignored Mr Market for a very long time and he has
felt neglected and marginalised.
Do not be too surprised if his anger upends the best laid
plans of mice and Fed.
Financial Times, 21 January 2016
1. Motivation
Theoretical and empirical analyses of trading and pricing in
financial markets have so far assumed that investors treat financial
risks as non-intentional, as if generated by a physical device the
workings of which satisfy blind laws of nature, like a roulette
wheel (Fig. 1(a)). As a result, decision theory andmachine learning,
disciplines that focus on physical risks, have formed the basis of
investments analysis (Markowitz et al., 2000), asset pricing theory
(Radner, 1972), and more recently, exploration of the neurobio-
logical foundations of financial decision-making (Bossaerts, 2009).
Sub-optimal choices and ensuing mis-pricing have been explained
in terms of heuristics that humans are known to resort to when
playing games of chance in casinos, such as gamblers’ and hot hand
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fallacies, probability distortion, or disposition effects (Hirshleifer,
2001).
We propose instead that humans tend to personify financial
risks, with whichwemean that they endow themwith intentional-
ity. Sub-optimal behaviour then emerges as the result of mistaken
application of Theory of Mind, i.e., the capacity (of mostly higher
primates) to put oneself in the feet of another person, perceive
this person’s beliefs, desires, and hence, intentions, and to act on
these perceptions (Frith and Frith, 2005). Theory of Mind is best
exemplified in instances of the matching pennies game, such as
when a soccer player tries to score in penalty kicks by avoiding
shooting the ball in the corner that the goal keeper chooses to jump
to (the penalty kicker is rewarded for mismatching, while the goal
keeper wins when she matches; see Fig. 1(B).)
Financial risks are generated in financial markets; those mar-
kets cannot and should not be thought of as intentional. At best,
intentionality is indirect, when they are populatedwith intentional
agents. Order flow and pricing are consequences of the meeting
of those agents, and as is well known from social choice theory,
actions that emerge from group decision-making generally cannot
be represented as if made by a single (representative) agent, ex-
ceptions notwithstanding (Sen and Pattanaik, 1969). Yet humans
appear to have a remarkable capacity to attribute beliefs and de-
sires to objects and systems that cannot possibly have those. This
capacity often helps themunderstand andbetter predict outcomes.
That is, humans often take an intentional stance (Dennett, 1989).
Here, we will show that this is true for financial risks as well.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbef.2017.12.011
2214-6350/© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-
nd/4.0/).
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Fig. 1. (A) Traditionally, participation in financial markets has been treated as analogous to playing games with a physical chance device such as roulette, shown here. (B)
Soccer (football) penalty kicks can be analysed as a matching-pennies game where the kicker (‘‘T’’) attempts to mis-match (chooses a corner different from the one the goal
keeper chooses) while the goal keeper (‘‘G’’) attempts to match (matches the corner). Key to playing this game is understanding the intentions of one’s opponent, and hence,
applying ‘‘Theory of Mind’’ (ToM). (C) In the eye gaze test, the subject is asked to characterise the intentions reflected in the gaze. The test is a standard way to score social
cognition. (D) In the Heider movie, two triangles and a circle move randomly across the screen. The moves can be predicted successfully by attributing beliefs and intentions
to the geometric objects.
An intentional stance is ‘‘the strategy of interpreting the be-
haviour of an entity treating it as if it were a rational agent who
governed its choice of actions by a consideration of its beliefs and
desires’’ (Dennett, 2009). It contrasts with a physical stance, which
aims at predicting the behaviour of an entity through analyses of
its physical (if innate objects) or bio-physical (if living organisms)
make-up. It also contrasts with a design stance, which is the ability
to predict from an understanding of the functionality of an object
or organism (what is it meant to accomplish?).
One could view the intentional stance as a crucial step towards
scientific understanding. Overwhelmed with complexity, humans
at first attempt an intentional stance when predicting outcomes
of a system (physical, biological, social). One could interpret attri-
bution to ‘‘higher’’ (divine) powers as an example of this stance
(which incidentally are often modelled in the image of the hu-
man himself; cf. Greek mythology). As understanding increases,
they switch to a design stance — they predict behaviour from its
purpose. When eventually the (bio-)physics becomes understood,
humans take a physical stance.
An intentional stance can only be defended if it works. To use an
analogy due to Dennett (2009), one could envisage an ‘‘astrological
stance’’, whereby one attempts to predict an entity based on the
alignment of stars associated with it, and indeed many people use
this to predict their own and others’ future. To our knowledge, it
has yet to be demonstrated to work. In contrast, we will provide
evidence here that shows that an intentional stance does work in
a financial risks context, albeit not always.
We humans often use the intentional stance to better under-
stand complex systems. Outcomes of a blind bio-physical process
called ‘‘evolution’’ speak better to one’s imagination if cast in terms
of an intentional system (which it is NOT!). Consider, for instance,
the following phrase: ‘‘When evolution discovers regularity or
constancy in the environment, it designs adaptations that tacitly
presuppose that regularity’’ (Dennett, 1989). The phrase describes
the outcome of evolution, but the verbs ‘‘discover’’, ‘‘design’’, ‘‘pre-
suppose’’ imply intentionality, which evolution does not possess.
Here we explore, (i) to what extent the intentional stance is
used in a financialmarkets context, (ii) whether andwhen it can be
successful, and (iii) how variations in its use over time and across
individuals explain choices and performance.
Traditional asset pricing theory does not treat financial mar-
kets as intentional. The assumption, in a static context, of perfect
competition (prices are taken as given), and in a dynamic setting,
of rational expectations (the future evolution of prices is taken as
given; Radner, 1972), implies that investors are tomerely optimise
in the face of a system that generates outcomes ‘‘as if’’ it were
a physical device beyond their control. When investors are given
the equilibriummapping from states to prices, as in dynamic asset
pricing theory, they are not to test its veracity even if their own
perception of how the economy works may generate a different
mapping (Bossaerts, 1998).
And yet, finance scholars themselves regularly resort to the in-
tentional stance. Indeed, prices in financial markets are explained
in terms of a representative agent. It is true that a representative
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agent will exist from the moment Pareto efficiency is reached,
but only in rare circumstances do the choices of this represen-
tative agent exhibit characteristics (e.g., preference parameters)
that could be recognised as ‘‘human’’ (Constantinides, 1982). Dis-
cussions as to whether preference parameters estimated from
historical financial markets data make ‘‘sense’’ tacitly assume that
the representative agent optimises like a real human being; rarely
is this admitted openly (Epstein et al., 2014).
The intentional stance requires what psychologists have been
referring to as Theory of Mind (ToM). This is the capacity to (i)
detect intentionality in one’s environment, (ii) ‘‘read’’ the inten-
tions, and (iii) act successfully upon them (Frith and Frith, 2005). To
detect intentionality is pretty much engrained: even non-human
primates pause and wonder when they observe a physical object
that violates the laws of physics, as if primates knew Newtonian
physics (Uller and Nichols, 2000). Infants generally cannot imagine
that others may have different beliefs than they themselves have.
The ‘‘chocolate in the drawer’’ problem tests the development of
the capacity to separate one’s own beliefs from that of another
person (Gallagher and Frith, 2003). To successfully act on a reading
of the beliefs and desires of others requires sophisticated social
cognition.
Quite a bit is known about ToM, so we should digress and
explain how to discern its presence, scope and quality. We do so in
the next section. In Sections 3–5, we discuss evidence from three
separate studies on financial decision-making. Section 6 discusses
the implications.
2. Theory of Mind (ToM)
Psychologists have developed several tests to determine the ex-
tent to which a subject applies ToM. Here, we discuss two, suitably
adapted to look like tests familiar from economics experiments,
where subjects are paid for performance.
One is the eye gaze test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Fig. 1(C)),
where the subject is asked to study a picture of a person’s eye
gaze and to choose one among four possible adjectives which best
reflects the beliefs or desires of that person. Here, ToM is real: there
is consensus that the person whose eye gaze is depicted actually
believed or desired as in the correct answer.
The second one we have used in the past is the Heider test. A
film of moving geometric objects (two triangles of differing size;
one circle) is shown (Heider and Marianne, 1944); see Fig. 1(D).
Most people discern a pattern in the moves, namely, a situation
where a third person (the circle) intercedes when one person
(the small triangle) is being bullied by another person (the large
triangle). Psychologists would ask subjects to describe the scene,
and thenmeasure the extent of application of ToM by counting the
number of belief- or intention-related terms in the description. To
determinewhether this helps,we add forecasting to the task: every
5 s we stop the movie and ask the subject to forecast whether the
two triangles will be farther apart or closer together 5 s later. Here,
ToM does work: to imagine a bullying scene helps in forecasting
the future distance between the triangles. There is no true inten-
tionality in the moves of the objects, and as such, ToM works only
‘‘as if’’.
We have also looked at brain activation for neural evidence
consistent with the hypothesis that ToM is being applied. One
does so by means of, e.g., functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) while a subject is watching a replay of financial markets.
Two regions of the human brain tend to be particularly active
in situations where subjects appear to be applying ToM, namely,
the dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex (abbreviated dmPFC, and some-
times referred to as the paracingulate cortex), and the Temporo-
Parietal Junction (TPJ) — or more precisely the posterior part of
the Superior Temporal Sulcus (STS), as well as the Inferior Parietal
Lobule (IPL) (Fig. 2(A) and (B)).
It is not sufficient that these two regions (dmPFC; TPJ) activate
in order to be sure that the subject is taking an intentional stance,
because functionality of dmPFC and TPJ is not limited to social
cognition. This ‘‘reverse inference’’ is to be avoided: because a brain
region shows a particular functionality in one task, and activates in
another task, this does not mean that the same functionality is at
work in the second task (Poldrack, 2006). Among others, dmPFC
is also engaged in tracking changes in latent driving variables
behind stochastic outcomes, as in Kalman filtering. To be sure,
Kalman filtering is not unlike ToM: the decision-maker uses the
evolution of outcomes in order to infer the latent variables that
caused the outcomes. In ToM, the latent variable is the mind of
one’s opponent; in Kalman filtering, it is a underlying physical
state of the world. A clear neurobiological separation has yet to be
found between inference about another person’s mind and about
an abstract underlying state (Suzuki et al., 2015).
fMRI is an imaging technique whereby the brain is exposed to
a strong magnetic field while radio pulses are being applied. This
allows the investigator to detect concentrations of oxygen-rich
blood, a sign that locally the neural cluster has activated. The signal
to come out of the analysis is referred to as the ‘‘BOLD’’ (Blood
Oxygen Level Dependent) signal. The BOLD signal provides an
indirect measure of neural activation. fMRI facilitates localisation.
To become more confident that ToM generated the activations,
we go beyond localisation (which brain region activates?) and
probe computations (what is the brain region computing?). We
posit a computational model of ToM, the output of which changes
with the continuously varying inputs. We require that the model
successfully predicts the subject’s actions. We then correlate key
variables in the model (e.g., uncertainty; predictions of the oppo-
nent’s reactions) with the fMRI signal. Beyond building confidence
that ToM is at work, this parametric form of fMRI (O’Doherty et
al., 2003) leads one to probe which theory (of mind) subjects are
applying. In addition, behavioural heterogeneity in the application
of ToM should be attributable to the relative strengths of the neural
signals.
Parametric fMRI can best be illustrated by means of a non-
controversial example of ToM. Consider the strategic game of
matching pennies, played with a real (human) opponent. Take
the case when the payoffs are asymmetric: the matcher’s payoffs
change depending on the action which she matches; see Fig. 2(C);
there, we refer to it as the ‘‘inspection game’’, and call the matcher
‘‘employer’’, and the mismatcher ‘‘employee’’. The Nash equilib-
rium of this game requires both players tomix: they cannot always
make the same choice because the opponent will exploit this and
respond with the action that is best for her. In other words, a
player should realise that he has an influence on the beliefs, and
hence, intentions of the opponent. As a result, it is reasonable to
conjecture that ToM is crucial in this type of game.
Not only did players indeed attempt to influence the beliefs
of the opponent; brain activation in dmPFC correlated with the
predicted effect of one’s current choice onto future beliefs, and
hence, future choices, of the opponent; activation in TPJ reflected
the ensuing prediction error, when the opponent ended up acting
differently from predicted. The activations are stronger for partici-
pants whose choices reveal more intense attempts at influencing;
see Fig. 2(D) (Hampton et al., 2008).
Proof that the activation in TPJ is causal has recently emerged.
In Hill et al. (2017), Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) was
applied to TPJ. TMS is a technique that allows the researcher
to temporarily disrupt signals in a brain region. Effectively, TMS
creates a temporary brain lesion. The authors showed how, in the
same game as inHampton et al. (2008), participantswere no longer
attempting to influence the beliefs of their opponent. Behaviour,
as well as neural signals in the brain regions to which TPJ projects
(such as dmPFC), changed.
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Fig. 2. Dorso-medial Prefrontal Cortex dmPFC (A) and Temporo-parietal Junction TPJ/Superior Temporal Sulcus STS/Inferior Parietal Lobule IPL (B) are activated when
humans attempt to gauge the mind of an intentional agent (i.e., apply Theory of Mind). (C) Payoff matrix in an asymmetric matching pennies game called the inspection
game, where an employee (row player) chooses to work or shirk when the employer (column player) has the option to inspect or not to inspect. (D) Activation in dmPFC
reflects predictions of the perceived influence of one’s actions on future actions of one’s opponent (bottom), while activation in TPJ/IPL/STS reflects corresponding prediction
errors (top). Plot: neural signals correlate more intensely with predictions when choices reveal stronger attempts to influence opponent beliefs as opposed to reacting to
the opponent’s past actions (‘‘fictitious play’’).
ToM thus plays a crucial role in strategic games between two
humans, and its neurobiological foundations are becoming un-
derstood. In the subsequent sections, we will see that ToM ex-
tends beyond the two-person setting, and provides insights into
behaviour and neural activation also when a person is confronted
with outcomes from larger-scale social interaction, such as trans-
action prices in financial markets.
3. Markets with insiders
In a first case where we conjectured that ToM could play a
role in explaining subjects’ financial decision-making, we replayed
markets with insiders (Bruguier et al., 2010). The markets were
part of an earlier controlled experimentwhere subjects could trade
assets in an online continuous open-book exchange; more details
are in Bossaerts et al. (2014). Assets paid a random liquidating
dividend between 0 and 50 (U.S.) cents. In a number of replications,
‘‘insiders’’ were given precise information of the final dividend; in
others, nobody was given privileged information and hence the
best guess of the payoffs was 25 cents.
We used a simple graphical display (Fig. 3(A)) to replay the
flow of bids, asks and trades while we scanned the observer’s
brains using fMRI. The observer was given the same information
as uninformed traders in the original experiment. She was asked
to monitor trades, and indicate with a key press when a trade had
occurred. While participants rarely made mistakes, the task did
require continuous attention, because orders arrived at the rate
of one per 0.7 s, and transactions occurred once every 3.2 s. The
observer was exposed to the risk in the market, as follows: at the
beginning of a replication, she had to decidewhether to take a long
or short position in ten (10) units of the traded asset at a price of
0.25 dollar per unit. At the end of the replication, the subject earned
the dividends on the 10 units minus the purchase price (if long) or
the purchase price minus the dividends (if short).
We contrasted brain activation across replications with and
without insiders. We focused on brain activation that increased as
transaction prices moved away from 0.25 dollar, the best estimate
of the asset’s payoff absent privileged information. We expected
neural activation in ToM regions when insiders were attempting
to profit from buying if their information about final payoffs was
favourable or selling if information was unfavourable, pushing the
price above or below 25 cents respectively. Without insiders, price
movements away from 0.25 dollar do not reveal anything about
final payoffs; at best they reveal that supply is tight (price above
25 cents) or plentiful (prices below 25 cents). Besides anterior
insula and amygdala, only dmPFC activated strongly, suggesting
engagement of ToM (Fig. 3(B)). Anterior insula and amygdala are
involved in tracking surprise (see Preuschoff et al., 2008; Prévost
et al., 2011).
Consequently, we hypothesised that ToM skills would explain
performance differences in a taskwhere payment depended on the
evolution of prices. We re-ran the experiment outside the scanner,
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Fig. 3. (A) Graphical display of order flow. Red and blue bubbles depict asks and bids, respectively, at prices (in U.S. cents) written in the circle; size of the bubble indicates
number of units offered (asks) or demanded (bids). Bubbles temporarily turn green when a transaction occurs. (B) fMRI signal shows higher brain activation in dmPFC when
insiders are present than when there are no insiders. Shown is activation that correlates with the distance of the transaction price from value of the asset in the absence of
information. The significance level (p) increases as colour becomes lighter, starting from red (p = 0.001).
but now stopped themarket re-play every 5 s and asked subjects to
guess whether the transaction price at the end of the subsequent
5 s interval would be greater than, equal to, or less than, the
last recorded transaction price. We correlated performance on the
financial markets prediction task with scores on the ToM Heider
movie test and on the ToM eye gaze test (see above). The correla-
tion between financial market forecasting performance and fore-
casting in the Heider movie equalled 0.35 (p < .05). Evidently, in
financial markets, an intentional stance helps in forecasting prices
based on order and transaction flow, just like it helps in forecasting
movements of geometric objects when these reflect some kind of
familiar social situation (the Heider movie test). Correlation with
scores on the eye gaze test were lower: 0.30 (p = 0.05).
In the eye gaze test, ToM is not merely ‘‘as if:’’ eye gazes depict
actual intentionality. This contrasts with the order and transaction
flow in a markets setting, or with the movements of triangles and
circle in the Heider test, where intentionality is only ‘‘as if’’. In a
financial markets setting, order and trade arrivals are the result of
interaction between (twenty) subjects; while each subject could
be considered intentional, the result of their interactions is not.
Note that the traditional theoretical concept used to analyse a
market with insiders, the noisy rational expectations equilibrium
(Grossman, 1977; Bossaerts et al., 2014) likewise assumes that
agents consider markets as non-intentional: all agents posit the
correct (noisy) mapping from states/signals to prices, and optimise
against it; they do not question the mapping; they certainly do not
attempt to influence it.
Curiously,we foundno correlation betweenperformance on the
financial task and scores on a test of mathematics and logic skills
typically used in the financial industry. Lack of correlation between
performance and mathematics skills re-emerged in a later study
on performance in a multi-person beauty contest game (Coricelli
andNagel, 2009). There too, ToMskills correlated significantlywith
performance in the game, while mathematics skills did not.
Participation in financial markets is complex. It requires not
only the ability to predict outcomes, but also capacity to convert
desired position changes into successful trades. Here, we have
related ToM to the first facet only. The relevance of ToM to explain
forecasting performance in markets with insiders has recently
been confirmed in an independent study (Corgnet et al., 2017).
However, in that study, ToM appears to correlate less with trading
performance. That is, better ToM skills do not translate into bet-
ter trading performance. Evidently, biases traditionally associated
with non-intentional risks, such as gamblers’/hot hand fallacies,
are better predictors of trading success.
Still, we should emphasise that we do not claim that the inten-
tional stance, and hence, application of ToM, guarantees eventual
trading success. We only demonstrate that ToM is relevant in ex-
plaining investor choices. Whether these ToM-influenced choices
are beneficial is a different matter. As we shall see next, ToM
is associated with riding financial bubbles that eventually crash.
There, the intentional stance ultimately leads to low performance.
4. Bubbles and crashes
We replicated the above experiment, but instead of markets
with insiders, we replayed a standard multi-period market exper-
iment where an asset paid a stochastic dividend at regular points
in time (fifteen in total) and expired worthless (De Martino et al.,
2013). The value of the asset decreased each time a dividend was
paid; the decrease equalled the expected period dividend. Bubbles
(prices above the declining fundamental value) regularly emerge
in this setting (Fig. 4(A)) though not always (Fig. 4(B); Smith et
al., 1988). This is fortunate: we could contrast behaviour and brain
activation in sessions that were identical except for the amount of
mis-pricing. Importantly, subjects were informed that nobody had
privileged (‘‘insider’’) information about upcoming dividends.
Compared to the previous markets replay, we changed one
aspect of the protocol: instead of fixing asset holdings at the begin-
ning of a replication and asking for confirmation of transactions,we
paused the replay at regular points in time, and allowed subjects
to change positions at the best standing bid or ask (Fig. 4(C)).
Consequently, the task was far more involved, and brain activation
correspondingly complex.
Here too, we discovered increased activation in dmPFC during
bubble sessions when contrasted with non-bubble sessions. Acti-
vation increased in the value of a subject’s portfolio, which were
inflated during a bubble, though only if the subject was ‘‘riding’’
the bubble (Fig. 4(D)). Importantly, the neural signal in dmPFCwas
significantly stronger for subjects with better ToM skills, but only
during bubble sessions. We measured ToM skills by the score on
the eye gaze test.
In an attempt to uncover the computations that dmPFC was
engaged in during bubble sessions, we correlated a measure of
irregularities in order arrivals with activation in dmPFC. Specifi-
cally, we applied a rolling-window statistic that measured non-
homogeneities in the order arrival process (i.e., random changes in
the arrival rate). We referred to it as the Poisson Inhomogeneity
Detector (PID). In bubble sessions, activation in dmPFC indeed
correlated with PID. Correlation increased with a subject’s suscep-
tibility to ride the bubble.We concluded that learning using ToM is
based on erratic order arrivals. This is not unlike the way in which
humans recognise intentionality inmovements of physical objects:
when such an object does not follow a straight path, humans
attribute intentionality (Uller and Nichols, 2000).
A remark is in order. Our PID statistic is related to the PIN
metric that has been claimed to track the presence of insiders
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Fig. 4. (A) Typical bubble in amultiperiod experimental market sessionwhere the traded asset has a declining fundamental value (value declines periodically after dividends
are paid). Blue: bids; Red: asks. Dashed line: fundamental value. (B) A bubble does not always appear. (C) Duringmarket replay in the scanner, the subject is asked periodically
whether to change investment in the asset. (D) dmPFC activation increases in the current portfolio value in bubble sessions (contrast with non-bubble sessions); increase is
stronger for subjectswithhigher ToMskills asmeasuredby score on eye gaze test. E. In bubble sessions (only), activation in dmPFC correlateswith ameasure of inhomogeneity
of the order arrival process (PID). Right: PID measure in one bubble session; measure is significant at p = 0.05 when it increases beyond the grey zone. Colours in B and D
refer to level of t statistic as indicated below each brain mapping.
(Easley et al., 2002). Importantly, here there are no insiders. Con-
sequently, PID and PIN metrics may not correctly identify whether
there are insiders in the marketplace.
5. Financial contagion
Our last evidence concerns financial contagion. We studied to
what extent investors’ risk attitudes could be affected by observing
risky choices of another agent (Suzuki et al., 2016). Here, the
agent is intentional, either a real human being (though in reality
it was a computer programme emulating human choices recorded
earlier), or a computer programmed to emulate human choices
(an ‘‘artificially intelligent’’ agent). In order to ensure subjects
paid attention, we not only asked subjects to observe choices of
the agent, but to predict their choices as well, after a period of
observation (Fig. 5(A)). Risk attitudes revealed in the choices of
the agent significantly affected the observer’s own risk attitudes.
Neuro-biologically, observing the agent’s choices biased the ob-
server’s neural risk signals. These signals emerge in a sub-cortical
structure crucial for instrumental learning, namely, the caudate
(Fig. 5(B)). Significantly, neural signals correlating with expected
reward or probability of reward were unaffected. That is, the
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Fig. 5. (A) Blocks contained ‘‘Self’’, ‘‘Observe’’, and ‘‘Predict’’ trials, where subjects had to choose whether to accept a gamble (Self), observe another agent make a choice
(Observe) or predict the other agent’s choice (Predict). (B) Risk-related activation in caudate became biased through observing and predicting the other agent’s choices,
thus generating financial contagion. (C) Extent of belief updating correlated with activation in ToM regions (dmPFC:circle; TPJ: oval), as well as a region involved in tracking
Bayesian surprise (dlPFC: square).
observer’s brain activation did not reveal any tendency towards
optimism/pessimism; instead, risk assessment changed.
Activation in ToM regions again emerged (Fig. 5(C)). This is
perhaps not surprising because subjects were asked to observe
the agent’s choices and predict them. Here, dorsolateral Prefrontal
Cortex (dlPFC) also activated. This region is known to generate
neural signals of Bayesian surprise. Here, surprise concerns the
extent to which the observer mis-predicted the agent’s choices.
Note however that ability to predict did not correlate with
extent of financial contagion (Fig. 5(D)). There is a mechanistic
explanation for this: the link between prediction and contagion
depended not only on ToM, but also on functional connectivity
between dlPFC and caudate. This connectivity has been associated
with executive function. As a result, contagion requires both ToM
and good executive function.
The contagion effect from observing other participants’ portfo-
lios has recently been confirmed in a markets experiment. Specif-
ically, diversification tends to increase when observing average
portfolios of others, while diversification is reduced when broad-
casting the (under-diversified) portfolios of recent winners. See
Baghestanian et al. (2015).
6. Discussion
Evidence has emerged that humans treat risks associated with
participation in financial markets as intentional, as if generated by
a mindful agent with own intentions and desires. This contrasts
with traditional and behavioural finance, where investors are as-
sumed to view financial risks as non-intentional, as if generated
by a physical device like a roulette wheel. The intentional stance
at times helps agents – as in the case of markets with insiders –
but at other times misleads them – as when deciding to ‘‘ride’’ a
financial bubble. Not all investors have an equal inclination to take
an intentional stance, and not all investors have equal capacity
to apply Theory of Mind (ToM), and this leads to cross-sectional
differences in behaviour and neural activation.
It is important to keep in mind that our claim is not that ToM
is beneficial. Our claim is that the intentional stance is being used
in financial decision-making, and that choice heterogeneity can be
explained by differences in inclination to, and skill in, applying
ToM.
It is equally important to appreciate that ToM is only part of
the story. In the case of bubbles and financial contagion, con-
version of plans into successful trades, i.e., execution, may blur
the effects of ToM. We conjecture that ToM is relevant mostly
in the investments sphere, where agents decide on portfolios on
the basis of their predictions of market evolution. In contrast,
trading engages a different layer of cognition, namely, executive
control, and the two sets of skills (ToM; executive control) do not
necessarily correlate. Corgnet et al. (2017) provides preliminary
evidence that, in the context ofmarketswith insiders, ToM skills do
indeed help subjects predict prices, but ToM skills do not directly
correlate with trading performance. Further evidence in favour of
the hypothesis that ToM skills are necessary but not sufficient for
successful trading is presented in Hefti et al. (2016).
One additional possibility is that the capacity for ToM interacts
with other variables such as quantitative skills, so that one or the
other is not sufficient for good performance; both are necessary.
Alternatively, it might be that there is a non-linear relationship, so
that some level of ToM ability results in a capacity to be vulnerable
to, say, bubbles in financial markets, but those with higher ability
are aware of the bubble and are better able to ‘‘get out’’ at the right
time. Higher ability may be related to a trader’s depth of reasoning
(strategic sophistication; Coricelli and Nagel, 2009).
Recent neuroscience studies suggest however, that is not quan-
titative skills, but ‘‘gut feeling’’, which is missing in the theory. In
the field, profits as well as tenure of professional traders increases
with their ability to sense heartbeat (Kandasamy et al., 2016). The
finding may not sound credible were it not that there is quite a
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bit of direct and indirect evidence for the importance of emotional
reactions in a financial setting. Lo and Repin (2002) found that
heartbeat of professional traders reliably tracks market volatility.
Critchley et al. (2004) discovered that the ability to sense one’s
heartbeat increased with the size of a crucial brain structure, an-
terior insula. Preuschoff et al. (2008) showed that neural signals in
anterior insula correlate with risk and with risk prediction errors.
As such, the path from heartbeat sensation to trading success is
traceable, and it involves anterior insula.
Remarkably, Smith et al. (2014) demonstrated that it is possible
to use activation in anterior insula to predict which traders will
successfully ‘‘ride a bubble’’. Using the same bubbles-and-crashes
markets setting discussed in Section 4, they show how elevated
anterior insula activation precedes timely exit from the bubble. The
sub-region where activation predicts success is the same as the
one where Preuschoff et al. (2008) detected risk prediction error
signals. So, while Theory of Mind predicts whowill ride a bubble in
the first place, volatility-related ‘‘gut feeling’’ appears to determine
who gets out in time.
Theoretical modelling of bubbles tends to treat bubble-riders as
passive ‘‘trend-followers’’ (e.g., Hommes et al., 2008; Barberis et
al., 2016). The research discussed here suggests that (some? all?)
bubble-riders are actually anything but passive. They engage in
forward-looking Theory of Mind, assessing the intentions of the
market and attempting to profit from being one step ahead of
the market. Bubble-riders behave more like the rational players
in Brunnermeier and Morgan’s ‘‘clock games’’ (Brunnermeier and
Morgan, 2010).
Behavioural finance has been inspired by the heuristics pro-
gramof Gigerenzer and Selten (2002), and the heuristics and biases
program of Tversky and Kahneman (1974). These heuristics and
biases concern non-intentional risk and uncertainty.Wewould ad-
vocate expanding the study of financial decision-making to include
intentional stance. The argument is that investors often take an
intentional stance in order to better comprehend complex systems
such as financial markets. Whether they benefit from it depends
on the setting, and, as we argued, ‘‘gut feeling’’, plus adequate
executive control.
The two aspects of human cognition, heuristics and biases, and
Theory of Mind, may not be orthogonal. For instance, one can
envisage that gambler’s fallacy emerges because of intentional
stance. Humans may have experienced that, in strategic games,
their opponents are generally not very good at ‘‘mixing’’: oppo-
nents create pseudo-random number sequences with runs that
are too short (except under explicit instruction; see Rapoport and
Budescu, 1992). As such, when humans perceive financial markets
to be human-like, they expect reversals to happen sooner than
when generated by a non-intentional risk source. The reversal
expectation causes gambler’s fallacy (Rabin and Vayanos, 2010).
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